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Abstract
Classic models on opinion dynamics usually focus on a group of agents forming their opinions interactively over a single issue. Yet
generally agreement can not be achieved over a single issue when agents are not completely open to interpersonal influence. In this paper,
opinion formation in social networks with stubborn agents is considered over issue sequences. The social network with stubborn agents
is described by the Friedkin-Johnsen (F-J) model where agents are stubborn to their initial opinions. Firstly, we propose a sufficient and
necessary condition in terms of network topology for convergence of the F-J model over a single issue. Secondly, opinion formation of
the F-J model is investigated over issue sequences. Our analysis establishes connections between the interpersonal influence network and
the network describing the relationship of agents’ initial opinions for successive issues. Taking advantage of these connections, we derive
the sufficient and necessary condition for the F-J model to achieve opinion consensus and form clusters over issue sequences, respectively.
Finally, we consider a more general scenario where each agent has bounded confidence in forming its initial opinion. By analyzing the
evolution of agents’ ultimate opinions for each issue over issue sequences, we prove that the connectivity of the state-dependent network
is preserved in this setting. Then the conditions for agents to achieve opinion consensus over issue sequences are established. Simulation
examples are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of our theoretical results.
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1 Introduction
Recently, opinion dynamics has attracted much attention
of researchers from various disciplines, such as applied
mathematics, economics, social psychology, control the-
ory, etc., due to its broad applications in modeling and
explaining complex phenomena in social and artificial net-
works (Degroot, 1974; Lamport et al., 1982; Hegselmann
& Krause, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2010; Frasca et al.,
2015; Ravazzi et al., 2015). In a social network, agents
form opinions on various political, economic and social
issues according to the information they received from
neighbors determined by the network topology (Jadbabaie
et al., 2003; Olfati-Saber & Murray, 2004; Ren & Beard,
2005) or the confidence/influence bound (Blondel et al.,
2009; Mirtabatabaei & Bullo, 2012; Jing et al., 2016). A
fundamental question in opinion dynamics is: how do the
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network structure and opinions’ initial distribution influence
the diffusion and aggregation of scattered opinions in the
process of opinion formation? In Degroot (1974), a model
is presented to characterize the process of a group of agents
reaching opinion consensus on a common issue by pooling
their subjective opinions, which is known as the Degroot
model. The interactions between agents are described by
a stochastic matrix which can be regarded as the one-step
transition probability matrix of a Markov chain and some
sufficient conditions for achieving opinion consensus are
provided. To further investigate how the interpersonal in-
fluence contributes to the opinion formation, the work in
Friedkin & Johnsen (1999) extends the Degroot model by
introducing a diagonal matrix which represents agents’
susceptibilities to interpersonal influence. In the Degroot
model and the Friedkin-Johnsen (F-J) model, interactions
between agents are specified by given networks. Different
from these linear models, in Hegselmann & Krause (2002),
the authors present a nonlinear model in which agents have
bounded confidence for others. In the Hegselmann-Krause
(H-K) model, two agents are said to be connected if and
only if the difference between their opinions is smaller than
a given confidence bound, which means that the network
topology of the H-K model is state-dependent.
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As the research in multi-agent systems continues, the
tools that are available within opinion dynamics have been
enriched considerably. The Degroot model is further in-
vestigated both on continuous-time dynamics and switched
topologies (Jadbabaie et al., 2003; Olfati-Saber & Murray,
2004; Ren & Beard, 2005). In addition, many complex sce-
narios are also considered, including asynchronous consen-
sus (Xiao & Wang, 2008), time delays (Wang & Xiao,
2007), finite-time consensus (Wang & Xiao, 2010), leader-
following framework (Liu et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2016), het-
erogeneous model (Zheng & Wang, 2014) and antagonistic
interactions (Altafini, 2013), to name but a few. Based on the
gossip algorithm (Boyd et al., 2006), randomized opinion
dynamics is investigated in Acemoglu et al. (2010), Ravazzi
et al. (2015), Frasca et al. (2015) and Li et al. (2013), re-
spectively. In Ghaderi & Srikant (2014), the equilibrium and
convergence rate of the F-J model are investigated. Under the
assumption that the adjacent matrix of the interpersonal in-
fluence network is an irreducible sub-stochastic matrix with
the row sum of at least one row strictly smaller than one,
the authors transform the F-J model to a random walk, and
the form of equilibrium is proposed based on the first hitting
probabilities of the random walk. In Bindel et al. (2011),
the F-J model is interpreted as a best-response game, and
the ratio between the optimal solution and the Nash equi-
librium solution, which is defined as the price of anarchy, is
discussed under both undirected and directed networks.
Most of the available literature on the F-J model focuses
on opinion evolving over a single issue. Yet the F-J model
does not in general converge to consensus over a single issue
due to the presence of stubborn agents. Actually, the empiri-
cal evidence shows that consensus may be reached over a se-
quence of issues (Joshi et al., 2010). In practice, associations
of individuals (such as small groups within firms, deliber-
ative bodies of government, etc.) are usually constituted to
deal with issues within particular issue domains which con-
sist of deeply interdependent issues, especially repeatedly
arising issues. In this scenario, individuals’ opinions for in-
terdependent issues are always correlated. Thus, extending
the existing theories of opinion dynamics to issue sequences
is necessary and can uncover the underlying mechanism of
opinion formation in the real world. Mirtabatabaei et al.
(2014) and Jia et al. (2015) modify the F-J model and the
Degroot model to investigate the evolution of agents’ self-
appraisals over an issue sequence, respectively. In Parsegov
et al. (2017), the authors present a multidimensional exten-
sion of the F-J model in which agents’ opinions for several
interdependent issues evolve over time sequences.
Different from the works which focus on agents’ self-
appraisal dynamics (Mirtabatabaei et al., 2014; Jia et al.,
2015) over sequences of independent issues, or evolution
of agents’ opinions for multiple interdependent but un-
ordered issues over time sequences (Parsegov et al., 2017),
we consider the opinion formation of the F-J model which
evolves over both interdependent issue sequences and time
sequences in this paper. Firstly, convergence of the F-J
model is studied over a single issue. The existing results
about convergence of the F-J model over a single issue
usually require that the interpersonal influence network is
undirected and connected or its adjacent matrix is strictly
row-substochastic (Ghaderi & Srikant, 2014; Mirtabatabaei
et al., 2014). We propose a milder sufficient and necessary
condition in terms of network topology to guarantee that
opinions of agents converge to constant values. Several
properties of agents’ ultimate opinions for a single issue are
provided. Secondly, we study opinion formation of the F-J
model over a sequence of interdependent issues inspired
by the path-dependence theory (North, 1990; Page, 2006;
MacKay et al., 2006; Egidi & Narduzzo, 1997). By virtue
of the inherent coherence between basic assumption of
the F-J model and the path-dependence theory, we assume
that the factor of each agent’s cognitive inertia over two
interdependent issues equals to its stubborn factor. Then,
each agent will form its initial opinion for the next issue
by making a tradeoff between its initial opinion for the last
interdependent issue and other agents’ initial opinions for
the next issue. The connections between the interpersonal
influence network and the network which characterizes
the relationship of agents’ initial opinions for successive
issues are established, and the sufficient and necessary con-
dition for the F-J model to achieve opinion consensus or
form clusters over issue sequences is proposed. Finally, we
consider the more general case in which an information
assimilation mechanism is employed to weaken agents’ in-
terpersonal influence. We assume that each agent maintains
a confidence bound in forming its initial opinions. This
assumption is consistent with the reported echo-chamber
effect (Sunstein, 2012; Dandekar et al., 2013), i.e., people
usually assimilate information in a selective way: they tend
to give considerable weight to the information supporting
their initial opinions, and dismiss the undermining informa-
tion meanwhile. Connectivity preservation of the modified
F-J model is analyzed. Then we derive the conditions for
achieving opinion consensus. The main difficulties for our
analysis are twofold. On one hand, the evolution of agents’
initial opinions over issue sequences is not directly deter-
mined by the interpersonal influence network and agents’
stubborn extent, which increases complexity of our anal-
ysis from the graphical perspective. On the other hand,
due to the fact that the evolution of agents’ initial opin-
ions over issue sequences is influenced by the evolution of
their opinions over time sequences, connectivity preserva-
tion of the modified F-J model is more complex compared
with connectivity preservation of the H-K model. As has
been widely reported (Ghaderi & Srikant, 2014; Frasca et
al., 2015; Friedkin, 2015), a social network with stubborn
agents does not generally achieve consensus over a single
issue. Our investigation shows that opinions of a group of
individuals can achieve consensus over each path-dependent
issue sequence 1 , even if agents are stubborn to their initial
opinions. Simply put, repeatedly arising or interdependent
1 In the sequel, we say that an issue sequence is path-dependent
or has the property of path-dependence if individual’s opinions
over it have the path-dependent property. A detailed explanation
of path dependence will be presented below.
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issues lead to consensus. Our study also provides a theo-
retical explanation for the cohort effect (Joshi et al., 2010).
Moreover, the evolution of opinions over issue sequences
enhances the connectivity of the social network. As long as
one of the partially stubborn agent’s opinions can scatter
to all the rest partially stubborn agents through partially
stubborn or non-stubborn agents, opinion consensus can be
reached, and all the partially stubborn agents form a star
subgraph in the network which characterizes the relation-
ship of agents’ initial opinions for successive issues. The
differences between opinion dynamics over issue sequences
and a single issue give us a deeper understanding of opinion
formation in social networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce some notions on graph theory and the F-J
model. In Section 3, convergence of the F-J model is studied
over a single issue, and some properties of ultimate opin-
ions are proposed. In Section 4, opinion formation of the F-J
model is investigated over issue sequences. In Section 5, we
consider opinion formation of the F-J model over issue se-
quences with bounded confidence. In Section 6, numerical
simulations are given to illustrate the effectiveness of theo-
retical results. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Notation: Denote the set of real numbers, natural num-
bers, n-dimensional real vector space and n × n real square
matrix space by R, N, Rn and Rn×n, respectively. 1n is a vec-
tor of size n having all the elements equal 1. In is the n × n
identity matrix. For a given vector or matrix A, AT denotes
its transpose, ‖A‖∞ denotes its maximum row sum norm. 0
denotes an all-zero vector or matrix with compatible dimen-
sion. ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius for a matrix A ∈ Rn×n.
By | · | we denote the absolute value, modulus and cardinal-
ity of real number, complex number and set, respectively.
Given a vector ζ ∈ Rn and a matrix sequence {Ak}mk=1 with
Ak ∈ Rn×n, diag(ζ) denotes an n×n diagonal matrix whose di-
agonal elements are the elements of ζ, diag(A1, A2, . . . , Am)
denotes an nm× nm block diagonal matrix with Ak being its
block on diagonal.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, some basic concepts on graph theory are
introduced. Then, a brief introduction of the F-J model is
presented.
2.1 Basic concepts on graph theory
A weighted directed graph (digraph) G of order n is a
triple G(W) = (V, E,W) which consists of a vertex set V =
{1, 2, . . . , n}, an edge set E = {ei j : i, j ∈ V} and a weighted
adjacency matrix W = [wi j]n×n with entries wi j. An edge ei j
is an ordered pair (i, j) which means that node j can obtain
information from node i, but not necessarily vice versa. i is
called the parent of j if (i, j) ∈ E. The adjacency elements
associated with the edges of the graph are nonzero, i.e.,
ei j ∈ E means w ji , 0, otherwise, w ji = 0. A directed path of
length m+1 from i to j is a finite ordered sequence of distinct
vertices of G with the form i, k1, k2, · · · , km, j. Particularly, if
i = j, the directed path is called a cycle of i( j). The directed
graph G is said to be strongly connected if between every
pair of distinct vertices i, j, there exists a directed path that
begins at i and ends at j. A maximal subgraph of G that is
strongly connected forms a strongly connected component
(SCC). In an SCC of digraph G, if there exists a vertex
which has parents belonging to other SCCs, we say that
the in-degree of this SCC is nonzero, otherwise, we call it
an independent strongly connected component (ISCC). The
directed graphG is said to have a spanning tree if there exists
a vertex that is called the root which has a directed path to
every other vertex. The directed graph G is said to contain
a star subgraph if there exists a vertex that is called the
center vertex which has directed edges to any other vertices.
An undirected graph is a digraph G(W) which satisfies that
wi j = w ji for any i, j ∈ V . For more details about algebraic
graph theory, we refer to Godsil & Royal (2001).
2.2 Introduction of the F-J model
The F-J model presented in Friedkin & Johnsen (1999)
sheds light on the relationship between interpersonal influ-
ence and opinion change in social networks. The F-J model
is a generalization of the Degroot model (Degroot, 1974).
It introduces a positive diagonal matrix to quantify the ex-
tent of each member of the group open to the interpersonal
influence.
Consider n agents forming opinions on a certain issue
in a network formulated by a weighted digraph G(W) =
(V, E,W). Each agent holds an initial opinion xi(0), i ∈ V .
The classic F-J model is:
x(k + 1) = ΞWx(k) + (I − Ξ)x(0), (1)
where x(k) = (x1(k), x2(k), . . . , xn(k))T ∈ Rn is a vector rep-
resenting the stack of opinions with k ∈ N being the scale of
time, W is a stochastic weighted adjacency matrix charac-
terizing the structure of the interpersonal influence network,
Ξ = diag(ξ) is the diagonal matrix mentioned above with
ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn)T ∈ Rn satisfying ξi ∈ [0, 1]. ξi represents
the susceptibility of agent i to interpersonal influence while
1 − ξi quantifies the extent to which agent i is stubborn to
its initial opinion. Here, xi(0) can be regarded as the inter-
nal opinions of agent i for the issue (Bindel et al., 2011).
Note that if ξ = 1n, the F-J model collapses to the Degroot
model. However, different from the Degroot model in which
disagreement is mainly the consequence of lack of commu-
nication, it is more likely the result of the presence of stub-
born agents anchored to their own initial opinions in the F-J
model. This is coincident with the empirical evidence that
failing in reaching agreement usually owes to the stubborn-
ness of individuals in practice, rather than the insufficiency
of persistent contracts and interactions (Friedkin & Johnsen,
1999; Friedkin, 2011; Frasca et al., 2015).
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As mentioned above, if Ξ = I in equation (1), the F-J
model is transformed into the Degroot model:
x(k + 1) = Wx(k), (2)
where W is a stochastic matrix. On the other hand, consider
the augmented system of the F-J model (1). Let xˆ(k) =
[x(0)T x(k)T ]T , we have
xˆ(k + 1) = Wˆ xˆ(k), (3)
where
Wˆ =
 In×n 0(I − Ξ) ΞW
 .
From equation (3), the F-J model is equivalent to the leader-
following structure (Liu et al., 2012) where agents’ initial
opinion are virtualized as stationary leaders.
3 Convergence of the F-J model over a single issue
A fundamental problem with respect to the F-J model is
its limiting behavior when the time scale k tends to infinity.
In this subsection, convergence of the F-J model is consid-
ered over a single issue. A sufficient and necessary condition
on the regularity of ΞW for convergence of the F-J model
is presented in Parsegov et al. (2017). Here we give a suffi-
cient and necessary condition from the perspective of the in-
terpersonal influence network G(W) which ensure that x(k)
converges to a constant vector as k → ∞. Firstly, we propose
the definition of the convergence of dynamic systems.
Definition 1 For a dynamic system with state vector `(k) ∈
Rn, k ∈ N, if for any initial state `(0), there exists a constant
vector ˆ` ∈ Rn, such taht
lim
k→∞
`(k) = ˆ`,
we say the system is convergent.
Lemma 1 The F-J model (1) is convergent if and only if 1
is the only maximum-modulus eigenvalue of ΞW.
Lemma 1 naturally follows from Corollary 2 and Lemma
5 in Parsegov et al. (2017). In Lemma 1, that 1 is the only
maximum-modulus eigenvalue of ΞW means ΞW has no
other maximum-modulus eigenvalues except 1, here the al-
gebraic multiplicity of eigenvalue 1 may be larger than one.
In other words, suppose λ is an eigenvalue of ΞW, then
|λ| = 1 implies λ = 1. Otherwise, let a + bi , 1 be an eigen-
value of ΞW with |a+bi| = 1. We have a+bi = ei arctan ba = eiθ,
where θ ∈ [−pi, pi] is the principal value of the argument of
a+bi. Thus, (a+bi)k = eiθk, which shows that (a+bi)k is pe-
riodic. Suppose that J is the Jordan canonical form of ΞW,
then Jk is periodic, which indicates that system (1) is non-
convergent. Let Ξ = I, one can readily get that the Degroot
model is convergent if and only if 1 is the only maximum-
modulus eigenvalue of W.
For two positive integers, we say they are coprime if and
only if their greatest common divisor is 1. For agent i, if
ξi < 1, we say it is a stubborn agent, otherwise, we say it is
a non-stubborn agent. In Golub & Jackson (2010), the au-
thors prove that the Degroot model (2) is convergent if and
only if each ISCC of G(W) is aperiodic from the perspective
of Markov chain corresponding to W. In Friedkin (2015),
convergence of the F-J model requires that the lengths of
all cycles of G(ΞW) are coprime. In the next theorem, we
propose a graph-theoretical condition for the F-J model to
achieve convergence by virtue of properties of irreducible
and primitive matrix’s eigenvalue. Different from the Deg-
root model (2), convergence of the F-J model only depends
on the ISCC composed of non-stubborn agents in G(W).
Before proposing our convergence condition, we need the
following lemmas in Horn & Johnson (2012).
Lemma 2 Let A ∈ Rn×n be irreducible and suppose that
λ ∈ R is not in the interior of any Gers˘gorin disc of A. If
some Gers˘gorin circle of A does not pass through λ, then λ
is not an eigenvalue of A.
Lemma 3 Let A ∈ Rn×n be irreducible and nonnegative,
and let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be the vertices of the directed graph
G(A). Let Li = {li1, li2, . . .} be the set of lengths of all cycles
of Pi in G(A), Let γi be the greatest common divisor of all
the lengths in Li. Then A is primitive if and only if γ1 = γ2 =
· · · = γn = 1.
Remark 1 Note that the condition in Lemma 3 is consis-
tent with the definition of aperiodicity (Definition 2 in Golub
& Jackson (2010)). For a nonnegative and irreducible ma-
trix, aperiodicity ensures that it does not have any periodic
eigenvalues, that is , it is primitive. Thus, aperiodicity is a
graph-theoretical criterion for primitivity. By the virtue of
aperiodicity, we provide a sufficient and necessary condition
concerning on the interpersonal influence network G(W) for
the F-J model to achieve convergence in the next theorem.
Assumption 1 For each ISCC of G(W) which only consists
of more than one non-stubborn agent, there exists at least
one agent having two cycles which are coprime in length.
Assumption 1 means that all ISCCs of G(W) consisting of
only non-stubborn agents are aperiodic. This condition is
milder than condition for convergence of the Degoot model
(2) which requires that all ISCC of G(W) are aperiodic
(Golub & Jackson, 2010).
Theorem 1 The F-J model (1) achieves convergence if and
only if Assumption 1 holds.
Proof. Suppose that G(W) has α SCCs with α ≤ n. Because
W is reducible, then there exists a permutation matrix P such
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that
W˜ = PT WP =

W1 × · · · ×
W2 · · · ×
. . .
...0 Wα

,
where Wi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , α} is the irreducible adjacent ma-
trix corresponding to each SCC of G(W) (Brualdi & Ryser,
1991).
Let Ξ˜ = PT ΞP = diag(Ξ1,Ξ2, . . . ,Ξα), then we have
ΞW = PΞ˜W˜PT . If there exists ξ j = 0 which is a diagonal
element of Ξi, then G(Wi) is separated into a vertex j which
corresponds to a row of ΞiWi with all elements being zero
and several SCCs with nonzero in-degrees in G(ΞiWi). Oth-
erwise, if G(Wi) has nonzero in-degree, or G(Wi) is an ISCC
but contains at least one stubborn agent, ΞiWi is a irreducible
matrix which satisfies ‖ΞiWi‖∞ ≤ 1 and contains at least one
row whose row sum is strictly smaller than 1. From Lemma
2, we obtain ρ(ΞiWi) < 1. If G(Wi) is an ISCC and contains
no stubborn agent, i.e., ΞiWi = Wi is an irreducible stochas-
tic matrix, then 1 is its only maximum-modulus eigenvalue
if and only if Wi is primitive. In this case, if G(Wi) contains
only one non-stubborn agent i, then the eigenvalue of Wi is
1. Otherwise, by Lemma 3, 1 is the only eigenvalue of Wi
that has maximum modulus if and only if there exists at least
one agent in G(Wi) which has at least two cycles with co-
prime length. In conclusion, 1 is the only eigenvalue of ΞW
with maximum-modulus if and only if Assumption 1 holds.
By Lemma 1, the F-J model (1) achieves convergence if and
only if Assumption 1 holds. 
Remark 2 In the available literature, convergence of the
F-J model over a single issue usually requires that G(W)
is undirected connected or every ISCC of G(W) contains
at least one stubborn agent (Mirtabatabaei et al., 2014;
Ghaderi & Srikant, 2014). Theorem 1 shows that the conver-
gence is achieved under the milder condition which ensures
condition in Lemma 1. The proof of Theorem 1 also implies
that each ISCC consisting of non-stubborn agents achieves
consensus as the F-J model converges. Note that from The-
orem 1, that each ISCC consisting of non-stubborn agents
of G(W) has at least one agent containing self-loop is a suf-
ficient but not necessary condition for convergence of the
F-J model. However, if G(W) is undirected, the F-J model
achieve convergence if and only if each ISCC consisting of
non-stubborn agents has at least one agent containing self-
loop in G(W). The proof directly follows from Theorem 1.
Next, we shall further analyze the ultimate opinion of
system (1). Employing equation (1) iteratively, we have
x(k) = Ψ(k)x(0), (4)
where
Ψ(k) = (ΞW)k +
k−1∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ). (5)
Since system (1) is convergent under Assumption 1, the limit
of Ψ(k) exists. Let Ψ = limk→∞Ψ(k).
Property 1 Ψ is a stochastic matrix.
Proof. Firstly, we show that Ψ(k) is stochastic for any k ∈ N
inductively. Note that ΞW and I − Ξ are both nonnegative,
thus Ψ(k) is nonnegative. From equation (5), we have Ψ(0) =
I and Ψ(1) = ΞW + I − Ξ are both stochastic. Now suppose
that Ψ(l) is a stochastic matrix, we have
Ψ(l + 1)1n = ((ΞW)l+1 +
l∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ))1n
= ((ΞW)lΞW +
l−1∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ) + (ΞW)l(I − Ξ))1n
= ((ΞW)l(ΞW + I − Ξ) +
l−1∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ))1n
= (ΞW)lΨ(1)1n +
l−1∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ)1n.
Since Ψ(1) is stochastic, we have (ΞW)lΨ(1)1n = (ΞW)l1n.
Therefore, Ψ(l + 1)1n = ((ΞW)lΞW +
∑l−1
t=0(ΞW)
t(I−Ξ))1n =
Ψ(l)1n = 1n, which implies that Ψ(k) is stochastic for any
k ∈ N. Moreover, since Ψ1n = limk→∞Ψ(k)1n = 1n, we
obtain that Ψ is a stochastic matrix. 
Property 1 shows that each agent’s opinion converges to
a convex combination of all agents’ initial opinions. Let
x∗ = limk→∞ x(k). Denote the set of fully stubborn agents
by V f = {i ∈ V |ξi = 0}, the set of partially stubborn agents
by Vp = {i ∈ V |0 < ξi < 1} and the set of non-stubborn
agents by Vn = {i ∈ V |ξi = 1}. Without loss of generality,
let V f = {1, 2, . . . , r1},Vp = {r1 + 1, r1 + 2, . . . , r1 + r2},Vn =
{r1 + r2 + 1, r1 + r2 + 2, . . . , n}. Let Ψ = [ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn],
where ψi ∈ Rn. The following property reveals the influence
of the interpersonal influence network G(W) and the levels
of stubbornness of agents to the ultimate opinion x∗.
Property 2 Under Assumption 1, for any i ∈ Vn, if there
exists j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp which has a directed path to agent i in
graph G(W), then ψi = 0.
Proof. Following equation (5), we obtain
Ψ(k + 1) − Ψ(k)
=(ΞW)k+1 +
k∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ) − (ΞW)k +
k−1∑
t=0
(ΞW)t(I − Ξ)
=(ΞW)k+1 − (ΞW)k + (ΞW)k(I − Ξ)
=(ΞW)kΞ(W − I).
From the proof of Theorem 1, limk→∞(ΞW)k exists. More-
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over, since limk→∞Ψ(k) = Ψ , we have
lim
k→∞
(ΞW)kΞ(W − I) = lim
k→∞
(ΞW)k(I − Ξ) = 0. (6)
Let limk→∞(ΞW)k = Q = [q1, q2, . . . , qn] = [qi j]n×n with
qi ∈ Rn, from equation (6) we obtain{
QΞ = Q
QW = Q.
Because QΞ = Q, we have qi = 0 for any i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp. It
follows from QW = Q that for any i ∈ V, j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, one
has
∑n
t=r1+r2+1 qitwt j = 0. Recalling that Q and W are both
nonnegative, we have that for any i ∈ Vn, if there exists
j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp such that wi j , 0, then qli = 0 for any l ∈ V ,
i.e., qi = 0. Furthermore, for aforementioned i ∈ Vn, l ∈ V
and qli = 0, if there exists u ∈ Vn satisfying wui , 0, then
qluwui = qli = 0. Thus, qu = 0. This indicates that for any
agent i ∈ Vn, as long as it receives information from any
stubborn agents directly or indirectly, there holds qi = 0.
Let Q˜ = limk→∞
∑k−1
t=0 (ΞW)
t(I−Ξ) = [q˜1, q˜2, . . . , q˜n], then
there holds Ψ = Q + Q˜ = [ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn] = [q1 + q˜1, q2 +
q˜2, . . . , qn + q˜n]. Since ξi = 1 for any i ∈ Vn, we obtain
q˜i = 0 for any i ∈ Vn, namely, qi = ψi for any i ∈ Vn. In
conclusion, for any i ∈ Vn, if there exists j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp which
has a directed path to agent i in graph G(W), then ψi = 0. 
In Ghaderi & Srikant (2014), the authors study the equi-
librium of system (1). Under the assumption that the net-
work topology is undirected and connected, they present the
form of equilibrium taking advantage of the appropriately
defined hitting probabilities of a random walk over the net-
work. However, since their conditions for convergence re-
quire that ρ(ΞW) < 1, the equilibrium is only related to the
initial opinions of stubborn agents. A similar assumption for
directed graph is presented in Mirtabatabaei et al. (2014). In
Property 2, we show that under the condition of Assumption
1, if a non-stubborn agent can obtain information directly
or indirectly from any stubborn agents, including fully stub-
born and partially stubborn agents, then the ultimate opin-
ion x∗ does not include the information of this non-stubborn
agent’s initial opinion. Otherwise, according to the proof of
Theorem 1, the ultimate opinion is also related to the initial
opinions of non-stubborn agents which form ISCCs with no
stubborn agents in it.
Remark 3 Property 1 and Property 2 also provide an in-
teresting perspective on leadership in social networks (Dyer
et al., 2009) and animal groups (Couzin et al., 2005). In
Wang & Xiao (2007), a generalized definition of “leader”
and “follower” is presented. A leader refers to the agent
who determines the ultimate state of the system, and the rest
are followers. This definition includes the notion of “leader”
and “follower” in which a leader is the agent who sends
information to others but never receives information. From
Property 1, Ψ is a stochastic matrix, thus the element of ψi
represents the proportion of the initial opinion of agent i in
each agent’s ultimate opinion. Property 2 suggests that if a
non-stubborn agent wants to determine the group’s ultimate
opinion, i.e., to be a leader, it must ensure that it is not in-
fluenced by stubborn agents. If we regard initial opinions of
stubborn agents as external information, then this result is
consistent with the experimental results in Dyer et al. (2009)
and Couzin et al. (2005) that the leaders emerging sponta-
neously in groups are usually the individuals who have more
power in communication or external information. Further-
more, for any individual who has no external information, it
can never be a leader unless it does not receive information
of the individuals who have external information.
4 Opinion formation of the F-J model over issue se-
quences
In this section, we study opinion formation of the F-J
model over sequences consisting of interdependent issues.
On one hand, most of the prior investigations on opinion dy-
namics are considered over a single issue. In practice, how-
ever, associations of individuals are constituted to deal with
sequences of issues within particular domains, and succes-
sive issues in specific issue domain are always correlated.
On the other hand, for individuals, related issues always
arise repeatedly in practice. Empirical evidences show that a
group of individuals who share a common set of experiences
will hold highly similar beliefs or characteristics (Joshi et
al., 2010). Hence, it is significant to consider the formation
of opinions over issue sequences.
Next, we shall briefly introduce the path-dependence the-
ory. The path-dependence theory is originally studied in eco-
nomic and institutional change (North, 1990; Page, 2006),
and subsequently developed in cognitive psychology (Egidi
& Narduzzo, 1997; MacKay et al., 2006). In Egidi & Nar-
duzzo (1997), path-dependence is observed in the behav-
ioral experiments of human groups. The main point of path-
dependence is “history matters”. That is, the decision one
faces for any given circumstance are constrained by the
decisions one has made in the past, even though past cir-
cumstance may no longer be relevant. This phenomenon is
ubiquitous in technological innovation, institutional change
and cognitive process of humans, etc. In the cognitive and
decision-making process of humans, people always have
cognitive inertia with which they are unwilling to change
their beliefs or decisions over interdependent issues. For ex-
ample, one may wonder that why the U.S. standard railroad
gauge is 4 feet 8.5 inches, which is an exceedingly odd num-
ber. A well known explanation for this question is that it
is resulted from path-dependence (North, 1990). Firstly, the
U.S. railroads were built by English expatriates and that is
the guage they built them in England. Further, the first rail
lines of England were built by the same people who built the
pre-railroad tramways, where that gauge was used. More-
over, the tramways were built by the same people who built
wagons using the same jigs and tools. In fact, that gauge
is the wheel spacing of the wagon. In this example, peo-
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issue s+1 ... 
ks ks-1 k2 k1 k0 0
issue s issue 2 issue 1 issue 0 
time 
Fig. 1. An issue sequence.
ple’s decisions over the interdependent issue sequence “The
gauge of the U.S. railroad”, “The gauge of the English rail-
road”, “The gauge of the tramway” and “The wheel spacing
of the wagon” remain unaltered. This phenomenon is named
cognitive freezing (MacKay et al., 2006). Since in the F-
J model, agents’ initial opinions can be regarded as their
internal opinions, we will establish a connection between
agents’ initial opinions for interdependent issues based on
the path-dependence theory.
Let s = 0, 1, 2, . . . denote a sequence of interdependent
or repeatedly arising issues over which path-dependence
works 2 , ks be a constant denoting the time at which issue
s arises, x(s, k) denote agents’ opinions for issue s at time
k. Suppose that issue 0 arises at time 0, agents stop deal-
ing with issue s − 1 and start to deal with issue s at time ks
(Fig. 1). Note that different from the assumptions in Mirta-
batabaei et al. (2014) and Jia et al. (2015) which require the
time interval ks+1 − ks tends to infinity, here ks+1 − ks can
be any positive integer. For a given issue s, system (1) is
modified as:
x(s, k + 1) = ΞWx(s, k) + (I − Ξ)x(s, ks), (7)
where x(s, ks) represents initial opinions, i.e., internal opin-
ions, of agents for issue s, and k ∈ [ks, ks+1].
Let ζi denote the factor of cognitive inertia of agent i for
two successive issues in an path-dependent issue sequence.
Note that the basic assumption of the F-J model is that agents
are anchored to their initial opinions over a given issue,
this is coincident with the path-dependence theory which
emphasizes that individual has the cognitive inertia over a
sequence of interdependent issues. Thus, we assume that for
each agent i, its factor of cognitive inertia ζi equals to its
stubborn factor, i.e., ζi = 1 − ξi. Then, basing on the game
theory formulation of the F-J model in Bindel et al. (2011)
and the self-reinforcing process of path-dependence (North,
1990), we assume that in forming its initial opinion for issue
s+1, agent i attempts to myopically minimize the following
cost function:
Ci(x) = ζi(xi − xi(s, ks))2 + (1 − ζi)
n∑
j=1
wi j(xi − x j)2, (8)
2 Note that the issue sequence is not necessarily consecutive over
time, some other uncorrelated issues may interpolate in it. For
example, Let S 1 = S 01, S
1
1, S
2
1, . . . denote a issue sequence which
consists of interdependent issues, and S 2 denote another. The is-
sues in S 1 and S 2 may be irrelevant and arise alternately. Without
loss of generality, we focus on each path-dependent subsequence
in this paper.
where the first term of Ci(x) depicts the cognitive inertia of
agent i to change its initial opinions (i.e., internal opinions)
for interdependent issues, and the second term represents
the willingness of agent i to escape being unsocial. As a
consequence, the initial opinion of agent i for issue s + 1
satisfies
xi(s+1, ks+1) = ζixi(s, ks)+(1−ζi)
n∑
j=1
wi jx j(s+1, ks+1), (9)
i.e.,
x(s + 1, ks+1) = Λx(s, ks) + (I − Λ)Wx(s + 1, ks+1), (10)
where Λ = diag(ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζn)T .
The hypothesis in equation (10) can be naturally observed
from reality. In practice, an individual always has cognitive
inertia over sequences of path-dependent issues, especially
when an issue arises repeatedly. In extreme cases, cognitive
inertia may reinforce into cognitive freezing with which in-
dividuals keep their decisions unchangeable, even they are
exposed to more efficient options (Egidi & Narduzzo, 1997;
MacKay et al., 2006). Next we propose an assumption about
G(W) which ensures that I − ΞW is nonsingular.
Assumption 2 For each ISCC of G(W), there exists at least
one stubborn agent in it.
Lemma 4 I −ΞW is nonsingular if and only if Assumption
2 holds.
Proof. Sufficiency. Since Assumption 2 holds, the proof of
Theorem 1 shows that ρ(ΞW) = ρ(Ξ˜W˜) < 1, which implies
that I − ΞW is nonsingular.
Necessity. If Assumption 2 does not hold, there exists at
least one eigenvalue of ΞW equals to 1. Namely, I − ΞW is
singular. 
From equation (10) we have
(I −W + ΛW)x(s + 1, ks+1) = Λx(s, ks).
If Assumption 2 holds, then I − ΞW is nonsingular. Since
Λ = I − Ξ, we obtain
x(s + 1, ks+1) = (I − ΞW)−1(I − Ξ)x(s, ks). (11)
Since ΞW + I − Ξ is a stochastic matrix, we have that for
any nontrivial Ξ and W, x(s, ks+1) = χ1n if and only if
x(s, ks) = χ1n, where χ ∈ R is a constant. Thus, we focus
on consensus of agents’ initial opinions for each issue in
the sequel. Now, we shall propose a definition of opinion
consensus for system (7), (10).
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Definition 2 System (7), (10) is said to achieve consensus
if and only if for any initial opinion x(0, 0), there exists a
constant χ ∈ R, such that
lim
s→∞ x(s, ks) = χ1n. (12)
Remark 4 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. If ks+1 − ks is
large enough for each s, such that
x(s, ks+1) = x(s,∞),
then, according to Lemma 4 and equation (7), we obtain
x(s,∞) = (I − ΞW)−1(I − Ξ)x(s, ks).
Thus,
x(s + 1, ks+1) = x(s,∞), (13)
which implies that agents’ initial opinions for issue s + 1
equal to their limiting opinions for issue s, namely, cogni-
tive freezing happens. This is consistent with our discussion
above that cognitive inertia can be reinforced into cogni-
tive freezing in extreme cases. For example, as more peo-
ple bought QWERTY keyboard, buying other keyboards with
different key configuration requires learning to type anew.
Thus, people’s opinions for the sequence of issues related to
keyboard will be locked in QWERTY keyboard, even though
there are many other more efficient types of keyboard (Page,
2006). Other examples of cognitive freezing are also re-
ported, such as the fall of the Dundee jute industry (MacKay
et al., 2006), the persistence of the narrow-gauge rail (North,
1990), etc. In Page (2006), the author attributes cognitive
freezing to the externalities of other people. Note that in
equation (8), we assume that each agent’s initial opinion for
the next issue is influenced by other agents, i.e., the inter-
personal influence creates externalities under Assumption 2,
which lead to cognitive freezing in equation (13).
Let Ψ = [ψi j]n×n = (I − ΞW)−1(I − Ξ). The next lemma
reveals the connections between G(Ψ) and G(W).
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 2, the following statements
hold:
(i) ψii > 0 for any i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp.
(ii) For any i ∈ Vp ⋃ Vn, j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, i , j, ψi j > 0 if and
only if there exists a directed path ( j, j1), ( j1, j2), . . . , ( jm, i)
from vertex j to vertex i in G(W), where j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈
Vp
⋃
Vn.
Proof. Let Ψˆ = [ψˆi j]n×n = (I − ΞW)−1.
(i) Since (I − ΞW)Ψˆ = I, we have
ψˆii(1 − ξiwii) = 1 + ξi
n∑
t=1
t,i
witψˆti, i ∈ V. (14)
Assumption 2 implies that if wii = 1, ξi < 1. Thus, ξiwii <
1 for any i ∈ V . From (14) we obtain
ψˆii =
1 + ξi
n∑
t=1
t,i
witψˆti
1 − ξiwii ≥
1
1 − ξiwii > 0.
Since 1 − ξi > 0 for any i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, we have ψii = ψˆii(1 −
ξi) > 0 for any i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp.
(ii) Since Assumption 2 holds, one has (I − ΞW)−1 =
∞∑
t=0
(ΞW)t. Let (ΞW)t = [ψˆti j]n×n. Note that ψˆ
t
i j > 0 repre-
sents that there exist paths consisting of t edges (maybe
appear repeatedly or contain self-loops ) in G(ΞW) start
from vertex j to vertex i. Moreover, if we take no ac-
count of the weights, G(ΞW) and G(W) have no differ-
ence except the edges to fully stubborn agents. Thus, if
there exists a directed path ( j, j1), ( j1, j2), . . . , ( jm, i) from
vertex j to vertex i in G(W), and j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ Vp ⋃ Vn,
we have ψˆmi j > 0. Therefore, ψˆi j > 0. Otherwise, we have
ψˆti j = 0 for any t ∈ N. Thus, ψˆi j = 0. Since ξ j < 1 for
j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, ψi j = ψˆi j(1 − ξ j), we have that ψi j > 0 for any
i ∈ Vp ⋃ Vn, j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, i , j if and only if there exists a
directed path ( j, j1), ( j1, j2), . . . , ( jm, i) from vertex j to ver-
tex i in G(W), where j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ Vp ⋃ Vn. 
Lemma 5 connects G(Ψ) with G(W), such that we can
address property ofG(Ψ) by analyzingG(W). From the proof
of Lemma 5, we have
Ψ =

Ir1×r1 0 0
Ψp f Ψpp 0
Ψn f Ψnp 0
 ,
where Ψpp ∈ Rr2×r2 .
Property 3 Any root of subgraph G(Ψpp) is a center vertex
which has directed edges to any other vertices of G(Ψpp).
Proof. Suppose that i is a root of G(Ψpp). Let (i, j) and
( j, l) be edges of G(Ψpp) for j, l ∈ Vp. By Lemma 5, there
exist directed paths consisting of vertices in Vp
⋃
Vn from
i to j and j to l in G(W), respectively. Thus, there exists at
least a directed path consisting of edges between vertices
in Vp
⋃
Vn from i to l in G(W). From Lemma 5 we have
ψli > 0, namely, there exists a directed edge from i to l in
G(Ψpp). Following the same lines as above, one has that
any root of subgraph G(Ψpp) is a center vertex which has
directed edges to any other vertices of G(Ψpp). 
Lemma 5 and Property 3 show that if there exists a di-
rected path from a stubborn agent i to a partially stubborn
or non-stubborn agent j in G(W), then (i, j) is an edge of
G(Ψ). Moreover, if G(Ψpp) contains a spanning tree, then it
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also contains a star subgraph. In other words, the connectiv-
ity of the social network is enhanced over issue sequences.
The block form of Ψ shows that fully stubborn agents never
change their opinions in the process of opinion formation.
Thus, we consider the scenario in which there are no fully
stubborn agents in the social network.
Theorem 2 Suppose that V f = ∅ and Assumption 2 holds.
System (7), (10) achieves opinion consensus if and only if
there exists a partially stubborn agent which has directed
paths to any other partially stubborn agents in G(W).
Proof. Sufficiency. Since V f = ∅, i.e., r1 = 0, we have
W =
Wpp WpnWnp Wnn
 ,Ψ =
Ψpp 0
Ψnp 0
 ,
where Wpp ∈ Rr2×r2 ,Wnn ∈ Rn−r2×n−r2 , Ψpp ∈ Rr2×r2 . From
Property 1 we have that Ψpp and Ψnp are both stochastic ma-
trices. Lemma 5. (i) indicates that Ψpp has positive diagonal
elements. Moreover, since there exists a partially stubborn
agent which has directed paths consisting of edges between
vertices in Vp
⋃
Vn to any other partially stubborn agents in
G(W), Lemma 5. (ii) implies thatG(Ψpp) has a spanning tree.
By Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 3.7 in Ren & Beard (2005),
we have that Ψpp is stochastic, indecomposable and aperi-
odic (SIA). That is, there exists a nonnegative vector ν ∈ Rr2
such that lim
s→∞Ψ
s
pp = 1r2νT , where ν satisfies ΨTppν = ν and
1Tν = 1. Note that
lim
s→∞Ψ
s = lim
s→∞
 Ψspp 0
ΨnpΨ
s−1
pp 0
 =
 1r2νT 0
Ψnp1r2νT 0
 =
 1r2νT 01n−r2νT 0
 ,
which indicates that Ψspp converges to a matrix of rank
one as s → ∞. Since Assumption 2 holds, we have
lims→∞ x(s, ks) = Ψsx(0, 0) = [νT 0Tn−r2 ]x(0, 0)1n, namely,
system (7), (10) achieves opinion consensus as s→ ∞.
Necessity. If there exists no partially stubborn agent which
has directed paths consisting of vertices in Vp
⋃
Vn to any
other partially stubborn agents in G(W), Lemma 5. (ii) sug-
gests that G(Ψpp) does not contain any spanning trees. This
implies that the eigenvalue 1 of Ψpp has algebraic multi-
plicity larger than one, that is, Ψ has more than one eigen-
value equal to 1. In conclusion, opinion consensus cannot
be achieved. 
As is often pointed out, the F-J model does not generally
achieve opinion consensus over a single issue even if the net-
work topology is completely connected (Ghaderi & Srikant,
2014; Frasca et al., 2015). However, Theorem 2 shows that
in the absence of fully stubborn agents, as long as there
exists at least one partially stubborn agent whose opinion
can scatter to other partially stubborn agents through par-
tially stubborn agents or non-stubborn agents, opinion con-
sensus can be achieved over a sequence of issues. The block
form of Ψ indicates that when there exists more than one
fully stubborn agent in the network, consensus can not be
achieved for arbitrary initial opinion unless the influence of
fully stubborn agents to others is identical (Friedkin, 2015).
Since the condition for achieving opinion consensus in The-
orem 2 is sufficient and necessary, it also gives the condition
for opinions of agents to form clusters.
Corollary 1 Suppose that V f = ∅ and Assumption 2 holds.
System (7), (10) forms opinion clusters if and only if there
exists more than one ISCC in G(W).
5 Opinion formation of the F-J model over issue se-
quences with bounded confidence
As discussed in Section 4, the cognitive inertia of agent
can be reinforced into cognitive freezing under Assumption
2, i.e., each agent’s initial opinion for issue s + 1 equals to
its limiting opinion for issue s if its opinion for s converges.
It is mainly because of the externalities created by agents’
interpersonal influence under which agents treat opinions of
others with no difference. However, in practice, people usu-
ally assimilate information in a selective way: they tend to
give considerable weight to the information supporting their
initial opinions, and dismiss the undermining information
meanwhile, which is named echo-chamber effect (Sunstein,
2012; Dandekar et al., 2013). Similar observations in animal
groups are reported in Couzin et al. (2005). In this section,
we consider a more general scenario that each agent main-
tains a confidence bound in forming its initial opinions.
For simplicity, we employ the assumption used in Mirta-
batabaei et al. (2014) and Jia et al. (2015) that the scale of
time k increases faster than the scale of issue s in this sec-
tion. In other words, the convergence of opinion x(s, k) can
be achieved with k increasing before the next issue s+1 aris-
ing, i.e., ks = ∞ for issue s− 1 and ks = 0 for issue s. From
Remark 4, we have x(s + 1, 0) = x(s,∞) under Assumption
2, which means that agents take their ultimate opinions for
the last issue as their initial opinions for the next issue. In-
spired by the echo-chamber effect, we suppose that agent
i forms its initial opinion xi(s + 1, 0) by taking a weighted
average of other agents’ ultimate opinions x j(s,∞), j ∈ V
which satisfy |xi(s,∞) − x j(s,∞)| < d, where d ∈ R is the
given confidence bound.
Let Ni(s) = { j ∈ V : |xi(s,∞) − x j(s,∞)| < d} denote the
set of agents whose ultimate opinions for issue s are within
the confidence interval of agent i, NΨi = { j ∈ V : ψi j > 0}
denote the set of neighbors of agent i in G(Ψ). Here we
employ a symmetric modification of the H-K model (Jing
et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2014):
xi(s + 1, 0) = xi(s,∞) + h
∑
j∈Ni(s)
(x j(s,∞) − xi(s,∞)), (15)
where h ∈ R satisfies h > 0 and 1− (n−1)h > 0. Note that if
the differences of agents’ initial opinions are large enough
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such that Ni(s) = {i} for any i ∈ V and s ∈ N, equation (15)
will collapse to equation (11). Combining equation (15) and
Lemma 4, we have
x(s,∞) = Ψx(s, 0),
and
x(s + 1, 0) = H(s)x(s,∞),
where Ψ = (I − ΞW)−1(I − Ξ), H(s) = [hi j(s)]n×n, and
hii(s) = 1 − h(|Ni(s)| − 1) i ∈ V,
hi j(s) = h j , i, j ∈ Ni(s),
hi j(s) = 0 otherwise.
(16)
For simplicity, we omit the time scale k in the sequel. Let
Φ(s) = [ϕi j(s)]n×n = H(s)Ψ, then we have x(s + 1) =
Φ(s)x(s). According to the partition of V , we have
Φ(s) =
Φ1(s) 0
Φ2(s) 0
 ,
where Φ1(s) ∈ R(r1+r2)×(r1+r2). Rewrite H(s) as a same block
form of W:
H(s) =

H f f (s) H f p(s) H f n(s)
Hp f (s) Hpp(s) Hpn(s)
Hn f (s) Hnp(s) Hnn(s)
 ,
where H f f (s) ∈ Rr1×r1 , Hpp(s) ∈ Rr2×r2 and Hnn(s) ∈
R(n−r1−r2)×(n−r1−r2). Let
Φ′(s) =
H f f (s) H f p(s)Wp f Wpp

(r1+r2)×(r1+r2)
.
Lemma 6 For any s ∈ N, if G(Φ′(s)) has a spanning tree,
then Φ1(s) is SIA.
Proof. From equation (16), H(s) is a nonnegative and
stochastic matrix with positive diagonal elements. By
Lemma 5, we have ψii > 0 for any i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp. Thus,
Φ(s) and Φ1(s) are both stochastic matrices and Φ1(s) has
positive diagonal elements. Since Φ(s) = H(s)Ψ, we have
ϕi j(s) = hi j(s) +
n∑
t=r1+1
hit(s)ψt j i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, j ∈ V f ,
ϕi j(s) =
n∑
t=r1+1
hit(s)ψt j i ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, j ∈ Vp.
(17)
Hence, for any i ∈ V f , j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, hi j(s) > 0 indicates
ϕi j(s) > 0. Moreover, Lemma 5. (ii) shows that for i ∈
Vp, j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, wi j > 0 means ψi j > 0. Thus, for any
i ∈ Vp, j ∈ V f ⋃ Vp, wi j > 0 implies ϕi j > 0. Because
G(Φ′(s)) has a spanning tree, we have G(Φ1(s)) contains a
spanning tree. Following from Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 3.7
in Ren & Beard (2005), Φ1(s) is SIA. 
Lemma 6 implies that as long as the connectivity of
G(Φ′(s)) can be preserved, Φ1(s) is SIA. This is on account
of enhanced connectivity of the interpersonal influence net-
work over issue sequences, which is shown in Property 3.
Next, we give the condition for H(0) to preserve connectiv-
ity.
Let y(s) = Ψx(s), then x(s+1) = H(s)y(s). Denote the set
of common neighbors of agents i and j for issue s by
Ni j(s) = {l ∈ V : |yi(s) − yl(s)| < d, |y j(s) − yl(s)| < d}.
From equation (15), we have that G(H(s)) is undirected. The
following assumption proposes the conditions for connec-
tivity preservation of G(H(s)).
Assumption 3 (i) For any i ∈ V f , j ∈ (Vp ⋃ Vn) ⋂Ni(0)
and l ∈ NΨj , l ∈ Ni(0). For any i ∈ Vp
⋃
Vn, j ∈
(Vp
⋃
Vn)
⋂Ni(0) and l ∈ NΨj , l ∈ N j(0) ⋂Ni(0).
(ii) For any i ∈ V f , j ∈ V f ⋂Ni(0), |Ni j(0)| > n2 . For any
i ∈ Vp ⋃ Vn, j ∈ V ⋂Ni(0), |Ni j(0)| > n2 + 14h .
As mentioned above, only if the difference between two
agents’ opinions is small enough, agents will take account
of other agents’ opinions. In Assumption 3, we give some
conditions about the distribution of agents’ ultimate opin-
ions for the first issue to ensure that G(H(0)) is adequately
connected and thus the connectivity of G(H(s)) can be pre-
served for any s ∈ N. Note that given a social network, the
interpersonal influence network G(W) and agents’ stubborn
extent Ξ are determined, and y(0) = (I−ΞW)−1(I−Ξ)x(0, 0).
Therefore, the conditions on y(0) in Assumption 3 are ac-
tually conditions on x(0, 0). From equation (15), we have
h < 1n−1 . Moreover, since |Ni j(0)| < n, from Assumption 3
we have h > 12n . Thus,
1
2n < h <
1
n−1 .
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 3, no edge in G(H(0)) will be
lost in G(H(s)) for any s ∈ N.
Proof. Firstly, we shall show that if Assumption 3 holds for
issue s, then it holds for issue s + 1. Suppose that for any
|yi(s) − y j(s)| < d, i, j ∈ V , Assumption 3 holds for issue s.
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For i, j ∈ V f , we have
|yi(s + 1) − y j(s + 1)|
=|xi(s + 1) − x j(s + 1)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣yi(s) + h ∑
l∈Ni(s)
(yl(s) − yi(s)) − y j(s) − h
∑
l∈N j(s)
(yl(s) − y j(s))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣yi(s) − y j(s) + h ∑
l∈Ni j(s)
(y j(s) − yi(s))+
h
∑
l∈Ni(s)\Ni j(s)
(yl(s) − yi(s)) − h
∑
l∈N j(s)\Ni j(s)
(yl(s) − y j(s))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤(1 − h|Ni j(s)|)|yi(s) − y j(s)| + h
∑
l∈Ni(s)\Ni j(s)
|(yl(s) − yi(s))|
+ h
∑
l∈N j(s)\Ni j(s)
|(yl(s) − y j(s))|
<(1 − h|Ni j(s)|)d + h(|Ni(s)| + |N j(s)| − 2|Ni j(s)|)d
≤(1 − h|Ni j(s)|)d + h(n − |Ni j(s)|)d
≤(1 + hn − 2h|Ni j(s)|)d
<d.
For i ∈ V f , j ∈ Vp ⋃ Vn, we have
|yi(s + 1) − y j(s + 1)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣xi(s + 1) − ∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jlxl(s + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jl(xi(s + 1) − xl(s + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣.
Noting that for any l ∈ NΨj , one has l ∈ Ni(s) and |Nil(0)| >
n
2 . Following the same lines as above, we obtain
|yi(s + 1) − y j(s + 1) |<
∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jld = d.
For i, j ∈ (Vp ⋃ Vn), we get
|yi(s + 1) − y j(s + 1)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l∈NΨi
ψilxl(s + 1) −
∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jlxl(s + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣.
Since for any l ∈ NΨj , Assumption 3 ensures l ∈
N j(s) ⋂Ni(s) and |Nil(0)| > n2 + 14h , we obtain∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l∈NΨi
ψilxl(s + 1) −
∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jlxl(s + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l∈NΨi
ψil(xl(s + 1) − xi(s + 1))
+
∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jl(xi(s + 1) − xl(s + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l∈NΨi
ψil(xl(s + 1) − xi(s + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jl(xi(s + 1) − xl(s + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
<
∑
l∈NΨi
ψil
d
2
+
∑
l∈NΨj
ψ jl
d
2
= d.
That is to say, if Assumption 3 holds for issue s, then no
edge contained in G(H(s)) will be lost, which implies that
Assumption 3 holds for issue s+1. Thus, no edge in G(H(0))
will be lost in G(H(s)) for any s ∈ N under Assumption 3. 
The connectivity preservation is a crucial and challenging
problem in research for the consensus problem of the H-K
model since the evolution of agents’ opinions is only associ-
ated with the initial states and their distribution. In Jing et al.
(2016), a potential function is presented to measure the total
difference of agents’ initial opinions such that the connec-
tivity is preserved by restricting the distribution of agents’
initial opinions. Following a different line, in Lemma 7 we
ensure that the links existing in G(H(0)) will never be lost
as s increases by proposing a lower bound for the number of
agents’ common neighbors in G(H(0)). In addition, differ-
ent from the modified H-K model considered in Yang et al.
(2014), in system (7), (15), the evolution of opinions over
time scale increases the complexity of our analysis.
Lemma 8 (Lemma 3.1, Ren & Beard (2005)) Let P1, P2, ...,
Pm ∈ Rn×n be m nonnegative matrices with positive diagonal
elements, then
P1P2...Pm ≥ η(P1 + P2 + ... + Pm),
where η can be specified from matrices Pi, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
By the proof of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, that the sub-
graph of G(H(0)) corresponding to stubborn agents is con-
nected also implies that Φ1(s) is SIA. In the next theorem,
we employ a more feasible condition which reduces the re-
quirements for the distribution of agents’ initial opinions.
Theorem 3 Under Assumption 2 and 3, system (7), (15)
achieves opinion consensus if the following conditions hold:
(i) there exists a partially stubborn agent which has directed
paths consisting of vertices in Vp
⋃
Vn to any other partially
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stubborn agents in G(W);
(ii) G(H f f (0)) is connected;
(iii) there exists an edge in G(H(0)) between a partially
stubborn agent and a fully stubborn agent.
Proof. From Assumption 3 and Lemma 7, we have that
G(Φ′(s)) contains a spanning tree for any s ∈ N. Hence,
Lemma 6 implies that Φ1(s) is SIA and G(Φ1(s)) contains
a spanning tree for any s ∈ N. Let ∆(s) = Φ(s − 1)Φ(s −
2) . . .Φ(1)Φ(0), then x(s) = ∆(s)x(0). From the block form
of Φ(s), we have
∆(s) =
Φ1(s − 1)Φ1(s − 2) . . .Φ1(0) 0
Φ2(s − 1)Φ1(s − 2) . . .Φ1(0) 0
 .
Since the set of all possible matrices H(s) is finite under
equation (16), Φ(s) = H(s)Ψ, one has that the set of all
possible matrices Φ(s) is finite, which indicates that the set
of all possible matrices Φ1(s) is finite. Moreover, because
G(Φ1(s)) contains a spanning tree for any s ∈ N, from
Lemma 8, we have Φ1(s − 1)Φ1(s − 2) . . .Φ1(0) is SIA for
any s ∈ N. From Wolfowitz Theorem (Wolfowitz, 1963),
there exists a nonnegative vector ν ∈ Rr1+r2 such that
lim
s→∞Φ1(s − 1)Φ1(s − 2) . . .Φ1(0) = 1r1+r2ν
T .
Thus,
lim
s→∞
Φ1(s − 1)Φ1(s − 2) . . .Φ1(0) 0
Φ2(s − 1)Φ1(s − 2) . . .Φ1(0) 0

=
 1r1+r2νT 0lims→∞Φ2(s − 1)1r1+r2νT 0
 .
Since Φ2 is stochastic, we obtain
lim
s→∞∆(s) =
 1r1+r2νT 01n−r1−r2νT 0
 .
Therefore,
lim
s→∞ limk→∞
x(s, k) = lim
s→∞ x(s) = [ν
T 0Tn−r1−r2 ]x(0)1n,
which implies that system (7), (15) achieves consensus as
k → ∞, s→ ∞. 
As we discussed in Rmark 4, cognitive freezing emerges
in model (7), (10) under Assumption 2. This is attributed
to the externality resulted from the interpersonal influence.
Thus, in model (7), (10), fully stubborn agents will keep
their opinions unchangeable for all issues. Theorem 3 shows
that the cognitive freezing is weakened by the bounded con-
fidence of agents so that consensus can be achieved even
in the presence of fully stubborn agents. Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3 show that consensus can be achieved by the F-J
model over a sequence of issues. Yet in the same context,
it generally fails to achieve consensus over a single issue,
even under completely connected networks. In practice, as
the number of the issues that individuals collaborate to deal
with increases, initial opinions of individuals for each issue
become more and more similar and reach agreement ulti-
mately. This phenomenon is named cohort effect (Joshi et
al., 2010), which describes a high degree of similarity in
characteristics or beliefs of a group of individuals who share
a common set of experiences. Moreover, this mechanism is
usually used to train groups for specific tasks (to name but
a few, athlete team, special action force or fire brigade) to
make the opinions or decisions of the group members grow
similar.
6 Simulations
In this section, numerical simulations are provided to il-
lustrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results proposed
above.
Example 1 (Convergence of the F-J model over a sin-
gle issue) Consider 10 agents labeled from 1 to 10
interacting with each other in digraph G(W1) (Fig.
2a). W1 is the stochastic adjacent matrix of G(W1).
Let ξ1 = (0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 1, 1, 1, 1)T , namely, V f =
{1, 2, 3},Vp = {4, 5, 6} and Vn = {7, 8, 9, 10}. Initialize x(k)
with x(0) = (−1, 0, 1, 1,−2, 0,−1,−2, 1, 2)T , the trajectory
of x(k) under G(W1) with k increasing is shown in Fig. 2b.
Note that in Fig. 2b, the opinions of fully stubborn agents
are fixed, while the opinions of partially stubborn agents
and non-stubborn agents tend to be constant as k increases.
The network G(W1) has four SCCs, i.e., {1, 4, 5}, {3, 6, 7},
{8, 9, 10}, {2}. The ISCC consisting of non-stubborn agents is
{8, 9, 10}, in which agent 9 and agent 10 both have two cycles
whose lengths are 2 and 3, respectively. Thus, Assumption 1
is satisfied. By computing we find that the maximum-modulus
eigenvalues of W1 are 1,− 12 +
√
3
2 i, and − 12 −
√
3
2 i, while the
maximum-modulus eigenvalue of Ξ1W1 is 1, which accords
with the algebraic condition in Lemma 1. In Fig. 2b, the
trajectory of x(k) is almost fixed after k = 20. When k =
20, one can find that the ISCC {8, 9, 10} achieve consensus,
while the other non-stubborn agent 7 has different ultimate
opinion with them. Moreover, we have ψ7 = 0, ψ8, ψ9 and
ψ10 are nonzero, which is consistent with Property 2 and the
discussion following it.
Example 2 (Consensus of the F-J model over issue
sequences) Consider 10 agents labeled from 1 to 10
in which agents 1 to 5 are partially stubborn agents,
others are non-stubborn agents. The network topol-
ogy is characterized by the digraph G(W2) (Fig. 3a).
Let ξ2 = (0.3, 0.6, 0.2, 0.8, 0.7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)T . x(0, 0) =
(−1, 0, 1, 1,−2, 0,−1,−2, 1, 2)T is the initial opinion vector
at s = 0 and k = 0. The trajectory of x(k) is showed in Fig.
4.
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Fig. 2. The network topology G(W1) and the trajectory of x(k).
Fig. 4 shows the trajectories of x(s, k) over issues s =
0, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, respectively. Note that over each issue s,
x(s, k) tends to a steady opinion vector as k increases, and all
steady opinions tend to be a common value with s increas-
ing. When s = 30, Fig. 4 shows that consensus is achieved
by system (7), (10). Moreover, since G(W2) satisfies the con-
dition in Assumption 2, we have Ψ3 = (I −Ξ2W2)−1(I −Ξ2).
From Lemma 5 and Property 3, the existence of a partially
stubborn agents in G(W2) which has a directed path to other
partially stubborn agents implies that the subgraph corre-
sponding to partially stubborn agents in G(Ψ2) not only has
a spanning tree, but also contains a star topology, and self-
loops are contained by partially stubborn agents in G(Ψ2),
which are shown in Fig. 3b. We can find visually from Fig.
3b that partially stubborn agents do not receive information
from non-stubborn agents, which indicates that ψi = 0 for
any i ∈ {5, 6, . . . , 10}. This is consistent with the theoretical
result in Property 2.
8
9
 10
6
3
2
4
7
7
6
partially stubborn agent
non-stubborn agent
1
5
a . G(W2)
8
9
 10
6
3
2
4
7
7
6
partially stubborn agent
non-stubborn agent
1
5
b . G(Ψ2)
Fig. 3. The network topologies G(W2) and G(Ψ2).
Example 3 (Consensus of the F-J model over issue
sequences with bounded confidence) Consider sys-
tem (7), (15) with 10 agents labeled from 1 to 10.
The network topology G(W3) is showed in Fig. 5a.
Let ξ3 = (0, 0, 0, 0.8, 0.3, 0.2, 1, 1, 1, 1)T , namely, V f =
{1, 2, 3},Vp = {4, 5, 6} and others are non-stubborn agents.
Let x(0, 0) = (−0.7, 0.2, 0, 0.2, 2,−2.5,−1.5, 1, 1.5,−1)T .
The confidence bound is set as d = 1. Since 12n < h <
1
n−1 ,
let h = 0.1. Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b show the trajectories of
x(s, k) and x(s, 0), respectively.
Because that in Fig. 5a, G(W3) satisfies the condition
of Assumption 2, Ψ3 exists. G(Ψ3) is depicted in Fig. 5b.
Moreover, G(Ψ3) and x(0, 0) satisfy the conditions in As-
sumption 3 and Theorem 3, thus x(s, 0) reaches consensus
as s → ∞ (Fig. 6b), which implies x(s, k) reaches consen-
sus (Fig. 6a). The connectivity of G(H(0)) is related with
the percentage of the fully stubborn agents. In this exam-
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Fig. 6. The trajectories of x(s, k) and x(s, 0).
ple, Assumption 3 requires that each fully stubborn agent
has at least 8 neighbors in G(H(0)). By computing we have
y(0) = (−0.7, 0.2, 0, 0.2, 1.46,−1.9876, 0.0082, 0.0274, 0.2,
−0.25)T , thus agents 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 form a completely
connected subgraph in G(H(0)), and agents 5 and 6 are iso-
lated with others, respectively.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, opinion dynamics in social networks with
stubborn agents has been investigated over issue sequences.
The social network with stubborn agents is described by
the F-J model. In order to investigate opinion formation of
the F-J model over issue sequences, we studied convergence
of the F-J model over a single issue and properties of the
ultimate opinion. Then taking advantage of the underlying
connections between the network of interpersonal influence
and the network describing the relationship of agents’ initial
opinion for successive issues, opinion consensus and clus-
ter of the F-J model was investigated over issue sequences
based on the path-dependence theory. Moreover, we further
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considered the more general scenario where agents have
bounded confidence to others when they form their initial
opinions. Mathematical conditions for opinions achieving
consensus or forming clusters were established, respectively.
We showed that the F-J model may achieve opinion consen-
sus over each path-dependent issue sequence, while it gen-
erally does not achieve consensus over a single issue. The
connections between network characterizing interpersonal
influence and the one describing the relationship of agents’
initial opinions for successive issues uncover the difference
between opinion formation over issue sequences and over a
single issue, such as the enhanced network connectivity in
the former. Our investigation may provide some theoretical
explanations for many observations in the real world such as
decision making in human society or animal kingdom. The
future work will focus on the evolution of agents’ extent of
stubborn over issue sequences.
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